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Informed Consent for the Use and Storage of
Residual Dried Blood Samples from StateMandated Newborn Genetic Screening
Programs
TUFIK Y. SHAYEB†
INTRODUCTION
Every year, approximately four million newborn infants
have their blood collected and screened for metabolic and
genetic disorders.1 The clinical and predictive value of many
of these tests is uncertain, casting some doubt on the
practical value of mandatory, non-consensual screening in
general.2 Nevertheless, state health departments in the
United States mandate newborn screening,3 and this
practice is firmly rooted in the widespread belief that the
benefits of screening for genetic disease in newborns
significantly outweigh the costs.4 Newborn screening
† Associate Attorney with Ewing and Ewing Attorneys, P.C. Formerly Executive
Editor of Accord, Phoenix Law Review Online, and Staff Editor of Phoenix Law
Review. L.L.M. Biotechnology and Genomics, May 2015, Arizona State
University; J.D., May 2012, magna cum laude, Phoenix School of Law; B.A. in
Philosophy, May 2008, magna cum laude, Arizona State University.
1. See Jennifer Kraszewski et al., Legal Issues in Newborn Screening:
Implications for Public Health Practice and Policy, 121 PUB. HEALTH REP. 92
(2006).
2. See generally id.; Bradford L. Therrell, Jr., U.S. Newborn Screening Policy
Dilemmas for the Twenty-First Century, 74 MOLECULAR GENETICS & METABOLISM
64 (2001).
3. See Therrell, supra note 2, at 67.
4. See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN
USING RESIDUAL NEWBORN SCREENING SAMPLES FOR TRANSLATIONAL RESEARCH:
WORKSHOP SUMMARY 5–8 (2010), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK52731/
(covering the benefits of newborn screening in Chapter 2); Bradford L. Therrell
et al., Status of Newborn Screening Programs in the United States, 117
PEDIATRICS S212, S213 (2006).
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programs regularly generate a cache of residual dried blood
samples that are sometimes stored for varying periods of
time.5 In some states, those residual samples have been
utilized in unrelated research and even shared with thirdparties without the informed consent of the families of the
donor infants.6
As a result of this practice, some states have seen
litigation from the families of newborn infants challenging
the constitutional boundaries of the non-consensual taking
of blood samples, the utilization of those samples in
unrelated research studies, and the disclosure of those
samples to unrelated third-parties.7 Some advocates and
commentators have called for a national, uniform solution to
this dilemma, with a frequently cited emphasis on requiring
informed consent.8 This Article, however, argues that while
informed consent should be required for third-party
disclosure of blood samples, non-consensual use of those
samples in research studies done for the benefit of advancing
the state’s screening program likely does not exceed a state’s
given constitutional authority.9
Part I of this Article briefly surveys the background of
newborn genetic screening, including the rise of mandatory
5. Therrell, supra note 2, at 67; see generally Adam Doerr, Newborn Blood
Spot Litigation: 70 Days to Destroy 5+ Million Samples, GENOMICS L. REP. (Feb.
2,
2010)
available
at
http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/
2010/02/02/newborn-blood-spot-litigation-70-days-to-destroy-5-million-samples/
(last accessed Oct. 6, 2010).
6. See Adam Doerr, Newborn Blood Spot Litigation: 70 Days to Destroy 5+
Million
Samples,
GENOMICS
L.
REP.
(Feb.
2,
2010),
http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2010/02/02/newborn-blood-spotlitigation-70-days-to-destroy-5-million-samples/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2010).
7. See, e.g., Higgins v. Tex. Dep’t of Health Servs., 801 F. Supp. 2d 541 (W.D.
Tex. 2011); Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d 766 (Minn. 2011); First Amended
Complaint, Beleno v. Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs., No. SA-09-CA-0188-FB,
2009 WL 5072239 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2009).
8. See generally Ellen Wright Clayton et al., Informed Consent for Genetic
Research on Stored Tissue Samples, 274 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 1786 (1995); see also
infra Part III.
9. See infra Part I.
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screening programs, the current status of such programs in
the United States, and the growing trend of residual dried
blood sample biobanking.10 Part II discusses several highprofile lawsuits that explored the major legal issues
implicated in mandatory, nonconsensual testing and
research.11 Finally, Part III of this Article examines potential
enforcement mechanisms for establishing uniform standards
and sets forth the argument that while informed consent
should be required prior to third-party sample sharing, it
need not be required for state-run research activities aimed
at improving a state’s newborn genetic screening program.12
This Article ultimately concludes that the superior approach
to addressing the concerns raised below is to allow a state to
maximize its constitutional authority while exercising such
authority in a restrained manner that accounts for public
sentiment.13
I. BACKGROUND OF NEWBORN GENETIC SCREENING
A. PKU Testing and the Rise of Mandatory Genetic
Screening for Newborns
For approximately five decades, state-mandated genetic
screening of newborn infants has boomed in the United
States.14 This practice arguably finds its genesis in Dr.
Robert Guthrie’s scientific breakthrough in the early 1960s,
when he developed an inexpensive and sensitive test for
detecting the human gene associated with phenylketonuria

10. See infra Part I.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra CONCLUSION.
14. See Beth A. Tarini & Aaron J. Goldenberg, Ethical Issues with Newborn
Screening in the Genomics Era, 13 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 381,
382 (2012).
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(PKU).15 The procedure for collecting the requisite blood
samples for PKU screening is still commonplace and is
relatively unchanged since the 1960s—involving a prick of
the newborn’s heel16 and the collection of blood splotches on
a screening card.17 The screening card, which is often referred
to as a “Guthrie card,” contains basic demographic data
regarding the newborn infant from whom the sample is
taken.18 Such data typically includes information about the
infant’s last name, the mother’s name, the infant’s date of
birth, and the infant’s height, weight, and gender.19 PKU
testing gained widespread support, due in part to the

15. See generally Diane B. Paul, Appendix 5. The History of Newborn
Phenylketonuria Screening in the U.S., LAW, SCI. & PUB. HEALTH PROGRAM
biotech.law.lsu.edu/research/fed/tfgt/appendix5.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2016).
Phenylketonuria is a metabolic disorder, caused by a gene mutation which
impairs the body’s ability to produce the enzyme necessary for converting the
amino acid phenylalanine into tyrosine. See id. Individuals that carry this
mutation require a specialized diet in order to allay the onset of developmental
retardation, in addition to more immediate symptoms such as seizures, albinism,
and unusual body odors. See id.
16. Collecting blood samples from the heel of an infant is sometimes referred
to as a “heel stick,” and is generally thought to be “a minimally invasive and
easily accessible way of obtaining capillary blood samples for various laboratory
tests . . . .” Timothy G. Vedder, Heel Sticks, MEDSCAPE, http://emedicine.
medscape.com/article/1413486-overview (last updated Nov. 18, 2015). A heel
prick is generally appropriate “whenever capillary blood is an acceptable [sample]
source.” Id. With improvement in laboratory techniques, which minimize the
blood sample size needed for diagnostics, blood specimens that are collected by a
heel prick can be used to conduct many other blood tests. Id.
17. See Mark A. Hill, Guthrie Test, EMBRYOLOGY, https://embryology.med.
unsw.edu.au/embryology/index.php/Guthrie_test (last modified Mar. 16, 2016).
18. See id. (providing an image sample of a Guthrie card).
19. See id.
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availability of preventive treatment,20 and ultimately became
the basis for the first statewide genetic screening program.21
The first widespread newborn genetic screening program
was launched in Massachusetts, where PKU testing of
newborns was imposed by state law.22 Reportedly, the
Massachusetts newborn screening program had two original
purposes.23 As Rachel Schweers notes, first, “the programs
created a comprehensive early checkpoint for the American
health care system to adequately monitor the health of the
infant population via the relatively easy access to a vast
majority of newborns.”24 Second, “the programs were
intended to detect metabolic abnormalities known to have
severe consequences, including death, that were discoverable
by a simple blood test and easily treated during postnatal
infancy.”25
There was, of course, notable concern regarding the
efficacy, value, and safety of widespread PKU testing and
treatment.26 These concerns prompted considerable
commentary and even the formation of a task force by the
American Academy of Pediatrics, as well as federal funding
20. “Early diagnosis and treatment [of PKU], consisting merely of a change in
the infant’s diet, can successfully prevent all the clinical manifestations of the
disease.” Robert Wachbroit, Making the Grade: Testing for Human Genetic
Disorders, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 583, 594 (1988).
21. See Harvey Levy, Newborn Screening in New England, MSUD FAM.
SUPPORT GRP. (July 20, 2009), http://www.msud-support.org/index.php/
newsletter/29-volume-17-1/163-newborn-screening-in-new-england.
22. Paul, supra note 15.
23. See Rachel L. Schweers, Newborn Screening Programs: How Do We Best
Protect Privacy Rights While Ensuring Optimal Newborn Health?, 61 DEPAUL L.
REV. 869, 875 (2012).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See TWILA BRASE, CITIZEN COUNCIL ON HEALTH CARE, THE UNTOLD PKU
TESTING STORY . . . AND WHY IT CHALLENGES GOVERNMENT-MANDATED NEWBORN
(GENETIC)
SCREENING,
2
(2008),
http://www.cchfreedom.org/pr/CCHC
pkunbsReport092408.pdf.
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of research studies, which explored the issues implicated by
mass genetic screening.27 On the other side of the emerging
debate, advocacy from entities like the National Association
for Retarded Citizens and the Presidential Advisory
Commission on Mental Retardation pushed along the
movement toward mandating statewide genetic testing.28
Two commentators, Ann Andermann and Ingeborg
Blancquaert, capture the essence of this debate while opining
upon the desirability of newborn genetic screening
programs.29 Andermann and Blancquaert note:
The benefits of genetic screening programs stem from providing
high-risk individuals with prevention, early treatment, or
reproductive options . . . Critics are concerned that the
“geneticization” of health and “routinization” of genetic information
are being used to justify the introduction of new technologies before
their potential effects are fully understood . . . There is also
growing apprehension that economic interests, with additional
pressures from consumer groups, might lead to a market-driven
approach to genetic screening policy development before the value
of screening has been demonstrated . . . In some instances, entire
communities have been subjected to discrimination or
stigmatization, particularly when there was insufficient
community involvement or education when developing screening
programs. Therefore . . . there needs to be a more “balanced and
informed approach to the development of genetic policies and
regulations” through greater consultation, transparency, and
public participation.30

Yet, as Andermann and Blancquaert further note, “[a]s with
any medical intervention, there is a moral imperative for
genetic screening to do more good than harm . . . not only
from the perspective of individuals and families, but also
from that of the target population and of society as a whole.”31
27. See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Newborn Screening: A Blueprint for the
Future—A Call for a National Agenda on State Newborn Screening Programs,
106 PEDIATRICS 389, 389–90 (2000).
28. See id.
29. See generally Anne Andermann & Ingeborg Blancquaert, Genetic
Screening: A Primer for Primary Care, 56 CAN. FAM. PHYSICIAN 333 (2010).
30. Id. at 333 (quoting Timothy Caulfield, Underwhelmed: Hyperbole,
Regulatory Policy, and the Genetic Revolution, 45 MCGILL L.J. 437, 452 (2000)).
31. Id. at 337.
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Sometimes, however, a tension develops between the
interests of individuals and the interests of societies as a
whole, and therein lies the conflict at the heart of mandatory
genetic screening programs.
B. Newborn Genetic Screening Programs in Recent Years
Ultimately, statewide testing won out the controversy
and now every state in the country has a newborn genetics
screening program.32 As of at least 2003, every state requires
newborn testing for PKU and congenital hypothyroidism.33
Alongside this expansion of PKU and hypothyroidism
testing, every state now also screens newborn blood samples
for additional genetically-linked disorders and illnesses.34
The exact list of genetically-linked disorders subject to
mandatory screening varies widely by state—but most states
screen for at least twenty-nine core conditions,35 with many
32. See Michelle H. Lewis et al., State Laws Regarding the Retention and Use
of Residual Newborn Screening Blood Samples, 127 PEDIATRICS 703, 703–04
(2011); see also Kenneth A. Pass, Lessons Learned from Newborn Screening for
Phenylketonuria, in GENETICS AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE 21ST CENTURY 385
(Muin J. Khoury et al. eds., 2000) (discussing the lessons learned from newborn
screening for PKU).
33. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NEWBORN SCREENING: CHARACTERISTICS
STATE PROGRAMS, GAO-03-449 at 9 (2003); see also Am. Acad. of Pediatrics,
supra note 27, at 393 (indicating that mandatory PKU testing was performed in
all fifty states and the District of Columbia).
OF

34. See Jeffrey J. Stoddard & Philip M. Farrell, State-to-State Variations in
Newborn Screening Policies, 151 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 561,
562 (1997).
35. See STEVE OLSEN & ADAM C. BERGER, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN
USING RESIDUAL NEWBORN SCREENING SAMPLES FOR TRANSLATIONAL RESEARCH:
WORKSHOP SUMMARY 1–2 (2010), http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12981.html;
National Newborn Screening Status Report, NAT’L NEWBORN SCREENING &
GENETICS RES. CTR. (last updated Nov. 2, 2014), http://genes-rus.uthscsa.edu/sites/genes-r-us/files/nbsdisorders.pdf; see also Am. Coll. of Med.
Genetics’ Newborn Screening Expert Grp., Newborn Screening: Toward a
Uniform Screening Panel and System, 8 GENETICS MED. 1S, 13S, 43S (2006)
(identifying and recommending twenty-nine core genetically-linked conditions for
which newborns should be screened); Beth A. Tarini, The Current Revolution in
Newborn Screening: New Technology, Old Controversies, 161 ARCHIVES
PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 767 (2007); For Families, NAT’L NEWBORN
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states adding more conditions to the list. Other examples of
commonly tested conditions include cystic fibrosis,
galactosemia, and sickle cell anemia.36 Not all conditions
included in these panels are treatable or preventable.37 In
fact, this issue in itself has been the subject of a fair degree
of controversy, as commentators have argued screening for
untreatable conditions is more harmful than helpful.38
Some authors suggest that the expansion of newborn
screening programs to include untreatable disorders
suggests a paradigm shift in the purpose of newborn
screening.39 “Although newborn screening for most disorders
still prevents deaths and disability, screening for certain
disorders under the new paradigm may carry less dramatic
or immediate beneﬁt, as well as beneﬁts beyond those to the
newborn.”40 In part, this paradigm shift was arguably
instigated by the federally funded panel, established by the
American College of Medical Genetics, which was tasked
with establishing criteria for determining the conditions that
should be accounted for in newborn screening.41 The panel
recommended broader criteria for evaluating the benefits
SCREENING & GLOBAL RESOURCE CTR., http://genes-r-us.uthscsa.edu/parentpage.
htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2016).
36. See National Newborn Screening Status Report, supra note 35; see
generally Piero Rinaldo et al., Recent Developments and New Applications of
Tandem Mass Spectrometry in Newborn Screening, 16 CURRENT OPINION
PEDIATRICS 427 (2004).
37. See generally Anne Marie Catharina Plass et al., Neonatal Screening for
Treatable and Untreatable Disorders: Prospective Parents’ Opinions, 125
PEDIATRICS e99 (2010) (describing a similar concern in the expansion of newborn
screening programs in the Netherlands).
38. But see Donald B. Bailey, Jr. et al., Newborn Screening for Developmental
Disabilities: Reframing Presumptive Benefit, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1889, 1889
(2005) (advocating for a broader perspective of “benefit” that would justify
screening for untreatable conditions).
39. Scott D. Grosse et al., From Public Health Emergency to Public Health
Service: The Implications of Evolving Criteria for Newborn Screening Panels, 117
PEDIATRICS 923, 923 (2006).
40. Id.
41. See id. at 924.

2016]

INFORMED CONSENT

1025

associated with newborn screening.42 The new criteria
“include all ‘outcomes’ and ‘negative consequences’ that can
be optimized or prevented . . . [as well as] beneﬁts to families
from timely knowledge of recurrence risks and the avoidance
of ‘diagnostic odysseys’ associated with delayed
diagnoses . . . .”43
Under the new paradigm, newborn screening is not
conducted solely for the benefit of infants. Rather, it extends
to the families of infants and society at large. As March of
Dimes President, Dr. Jennifer L. Howse, notes, in
commenting on Newborn Screening Saves Lives
Reauthorization Act, “[g]iven that one in every 300 infants
has a condition that can be detected through this screening,
newborn screening represents an indispensable investment
in health, families, and our economy.”44 Any state-mandated
activity is going to tax the privacy interests of individual
persons. But with some doubt as to the justifications for
newborn screening programs to begin with, there arise some
very serious concerns regarding the attenuated justifications
for allowing states to utilize potentially ill-gotten gains in a
way that would further cast doubt on the practice as a whole.
C. Residual Dried Blood Samples and Non-Screening Uses
All states mandate newborn testing,45 with relatively
little or sometimes no disclosure regarding the state’s
retention of residual dried blood samples, the bio-banking of
those samples, or the use of such samples in unrelated
42. See id.
43. Id. at 924–25.
44. Newborn Screening Saves Lives Reauthorization Act Goes to President for
Signature into Law, PRNEWSWIRE (Dec. 10, 2014, 5:53 PM), http://www.prnews
wire.com/news-releases/newborn-screening-saves-lives-reauthorization-actgoes-to-president-for-signature-into-law-300008138.html.
45. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 33. However, thirty-three states
provide exemptions from newborn testing for religious reasons, and thirteen
additional states provide exemptions from testing for any reason. Id.
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research studies.46 Typically, residual dried blood samples
from Guthrie cards are stored anywhere from two weeks to
an indefinite period of time, depending on state law.47 Olney
et al. surveyed state use of newborn blood spots, to which
forty-nine states responded, and found that seventy-four
percent of the respondents used residual samples to evaluate
the screening tests themselves, fifty-two percent of the
respondents used residual samples for clinical or forensic
testing, and twenty-eight percent of the respondents used
residual samples in epidemiologic studies.48
Some authors have suggested that there is an emerging
trend toward “biobanking” in the United States.49 As of 2008,
for instance, researchers in the United States had banked an
estimated 270 million samples, which was growing at the
rate of about 20 million new samples per year.50 This trend
has been fueled in part by relatively recent advancements in
human genome mapping and the consistently decreasing
costs of genetic testing.51 “The first time scientists sequenced
a person’s entire genome, it took more than a decade and cost
hundreds of millions of dollars. [As of August of 2014], such
sequencing takes less than twenty-four hours and costs less
46. See Richard S. Olney et al., Storage and Use of Residual Dried Blood Spots
from State Newborn Screening Programs, 148 J. PEDIATRICS 618, 619–21 (2006).
47. See Linda Kharaboyan et al., Storing Newborn Blood Spots: Modern
Controversies, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 741, 743 (2004).
48. Olney et al., supra note 46, at 619–20.
49. See Jean E. McEwen & Philip R. Reilly, Stored Guthrie Cards as DNA
“Banks,” 55 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 196, 196 (1994). A “biobank” is a repository of
biological materials, such as those storing tissue samples for later use in medical
and biotechnological research. See VIRTUAL OFFICE OF GENOMICS, POPULATIONBASED BIOBANKS AND GENETICS RESEARCH IN CONNECTICUT (2007),
http://www.ct.gov/dph/LIB/dph/Genomics/biobankspolicybrief.pdf.
50. Susanne B. Haga & Laura M. Beskow, Ethical, Legal, and Social
Implications of Biobanks for Genetic Research, 60 ADVANCES GENETICS 505, 507
(2008).
51. See Peter Ubel, Will Lowering the Price of Genetic Testing Raise the Cost
of Medical Care?, FORBES (Aug. 25, 2014, 2:51 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
peterubel/2014/08/25/will-lowering-the-price-of-genetic-testing-raise-the-cost-ofmedical-care/#26173a253f0f.
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than $5000 . . . .”52 With the cost of human genome mapping
on the decline, the notion of mass biobanking becomes more
feasible, at least insofar as it is an economic matter.
This trend toward biobanking would invariably be
encouraged and supported by favorable informed consent
policies applied to state-mandated genetic screening
programs. For example, the State of Michigan has founded
the Michigan BioTrust for Health, which indefinitely stores
residual dried blood samples taken from the State’s newborn
screening program unless the guardian of a newborn (or the
newborn upon reaching the age of majority) opts out of the
process.53 The BioTrust for Health website provides a
snapshot description of the evolution of the dried blood spot
storage policy of the State of Michigan:
Blood spots have always been stored [in the State of Michigan] for
some period of time following newborn screening, but the length of
time has changed over the years. In the 1970s, samples were saved
for 7 years. In the 1980s, the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) changed the policy to store each sample for 21.5
years following the receipt of legal advice. In 2008, the policy was
revised for indefinite storage of blood spots to align with a
recommendation from the Governor’s Commission on Genetic
Privacy and Progress. Today, blood spots are still stored
indefinitely (forever) once newborn screening is completed. The
changes in storage policy have allowed for a collection of stored
blood spots dating back to July 1984. Any samples received by the

52. Id.
53. Michigan BioTrust for Health, MICH. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
http://www.michigan.gov/mdhhs/0,5885,7-339-73971_4911_4916_53246--,00.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2016). See generally BioTrust Frequently Asked
Questions, MICH. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.michigan.gov/
documents/mdch/FAQ_Part_2_What_Is_The_Michigan_BioTrust_for_Health_49
0152_7.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2016) (“MDHHS is responsible for the blood spot
samples, holding them ‘in trust’ for future research. The Michigan Neonatal
Biobank (www.mnbb.org), a 501c3 non-profit charitable organization, is
responsible for storage and day-to-day management of the blood spots.”).
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state laboratory on infants born before July 1984 have been
destroyed.54

Interestingly, the Policy and Procedure Manual of the
Michigan Department of Community Health explicitly states
that the dried blood samples remain the “qualified” property
of the Michigan Department of Community Health while
such samples remain in storage.55
The beneficial applications of biobanking are enticing.
Some sources report that “epigenetic information stored on
archived Guthrie cards provides a retrospective view of the
epigenome at birth, a powerful new application for the card
that could help understand disease and predict future
health.”56 Other authors have noted that biobanks allow
researchers to develop “target-orientated preventive,
diagnostic and therapeutic interventions” in order to
“promote personalized medicine and health care.”57
Epidemiological studies, based on surveillance, are made
possible by gathering data from population-based biobanks
and analyzing genetic information in the context of donor
demographics.58
It is unsurprising then that the Centers for Disease
Control has indicated in the last few years that it intends to
coordinate a biobank of samples taken from state newborn
54. Michigan BioTrust for Health–Consent Options, MICH. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., http://www.michigan.gov/mdhhs/0,5885,7-339-73971_4911_4916_5
3246-244016--,00.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).
55. Policy and Procedure Manual, MICH. DEP’T CMTY. HEALTH, http://www.
michigan.gov/documents/mdch/11.1_NBSspecimenretentionpolicy_316310_7.pdf
(last visited Apr. 25, 2016).
56. Archived Guthrie Cards Find a New Purpose, SCIENCE DAILY (Aug. 22,
2012), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/08/120822181346.htm; see also
Huriya Beyan et al., Guthrie Card Methylomics Identifies Temporally Stable
Epialleles That Are Present at Birth in Humans, 22 GENOME RES. 2138,
2138 (2012).
57. Angela Brand et al., Biobanking for Public Health, in TRUST IN
BIOBANKING: DEALING WITH ETHICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN AN EMERGING
FIELD OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 3, 7 (Peter Dabrock et al. eds., 2012).
58. See generally id. at 9–11.

2016]

INFORMED CONSENT

1029

screening programs.59 In doing so, the Centers for Disease
Control hopes to generate materials for epidemiology
research.60 The exact number of states that biobank newborn
blood samples is unknown, as a majority of states have no
written policy regarding the length of retention of such
samples.61 However, the potential for generating a single,
national cache of samples from state programs is well
recognized and ultimately highlights the pertinence of this
discussion.62 Whatever controversies may arise, newborn
screening programs appear to be deeply anchored in state
practices and are likely here to stay.
II. LITIGATION INVOLVING RESIDUAL SAMPLES FROM
NEWBORN SCREENING
Mandatory newborn screening has already seen a fair
degree of litigation. One noteworthy case, Douglas County v.
Anaya, provides valuable insight into the constitutionality of
mandatory screening.63 Several other high profile cases have
explored issues regarding the use of residual samples for
59. See Public Health Genomics Program Review, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/genomics/about/reports/2008/chap5.htm [https:
//web.archive.org/web/20150908071645/http://www.cdc.gov/genomics/about/
reports/2008/chap5.htm] (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
60. See id.
61. See Bradford L. Therrell et al., Status of Newborn Screening Programs in
the United States, 117 PEDIATRICS S212, S222 (2006) (indicating that most states
have no written policy on the length of retention of Guthrie card samples).
62. Large scale genetic biobanks are controversial, with some commentators
expressing concern over the need for revisiting traditional and commonly
accepted methods of obtaining informed consent in the context of biobanking. See
generally Henry T. Greely, The Uneasy Ethical and Legal Underpinnings of
Large-Scale Genomic Biobanks, 8 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 343
(2007); Oonagh Corrigan, Biobanks: Can They Overcome Controversy and Deliver
on Their Promise to Unravel the Origins of Common Diseases?, 40 MED. EDUC.
500 (2006). As Greely comments, procedures which obtain broad and general
consent should be replaced with consent mechanisms that give subjects greater
control over potentially objectionable uses of their information and biological
samples. Greely, supra, at 343.
63. See generally Douglas Cty. v. Anaya, 694 N.W.2d 601 (Neb. 2005).
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purposes other than newborn screening, such as program
development and third-party research.64 These cases are
instructive in that they illustrate some of the major legal
issues implicated by mandatory newborn screening
programs and serve as a starting point for analyzing the best
approach to dealing with the problem of consent. This Part
discusses the constitutionality of mandatory genetic
newborn screening before exploring the interplay of genetic
privacy and newborn screening and the legality of sharing
residual blood samples with third parties.65
A. The Constitutionality of Mandatory Genetic Newborn
Screening
Anaya, which was heard by the Nebraska Supreme
Court, entertained federal constitutional challenges to
Nebraska’s newborn genetic screening program.66 In 2003,
Rosa Anaya was born into the Anaya family during a
homebirth and in the absence of a licensed physician.67 At the
time of Rosa Anaya’s birth, a Nebraska statute provided that
“[a]ll infants born in the State of Nebraska shall be screened
for phenylketonuria, primary hypothyroidism, biotinidase
deficiency, galactosemia, hemoglobinopathies . . . (MCAD)
deficiency, and such other metabolic diseases . . . .”68 The
month following Rosa Anaya’s birth, the Nebraska
Department of Human Health Services (NDHHS) reviewed
the records of the birth and noted that Rosa Anaya had not

64. See, e.g., Higgins v. Tex. Dep’t of Health Servs., 801 F. Supp. 2d 541, 544
(W.D. Tex. 2011); Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 2011); First
Amended Complaint, supra note 7.
65. See infra Part II.A–C.
66. See Anaya, 694 N.W.2d at 603–04. A similar challenge was raised in
federal district court in the District of Nebraska. See Spiering v. Heineman, 448
F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1131 (D. Neb. 2006).
67. Anaya, 964 N.W.2d at 604.
68. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-519 (2003).
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undergone the screening process required by state’s newborn
screening statute.69
The NDHHS delivered a brochure to the Anaya family
detailing the requirements of the screening program, as well
as the method of collection, together with a request to have
Rosa Anaya screened.70 The Anaya family refused to submit
the child for blood spot collection, claiming that the activity
was contrary to their “sincerely held religious beliefs” that
blood-letting would reduce their infant’s lifespan.71 The
NDHHS initiated legal proceedings against the Anaya
family, and the trial court ultimately found in favor of the
government.72 The Anaya family appealed the matter,
claiming that the statute violated their First Amendment
right to free exercise of religion.73 The Anaya family also
argued that the statute violated their substantive due
process rights as parents under the Fourteenth
Amendment.74
The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected the Anayas’ First
Amendment claim, finding that the statute was neutral and
generally applicable.75 As such, the matter did not require
strict scrutiny, and Nebraska was not required to
demonstrate a compelling state interest.76 Rather, the First
Amendment claim was subject to review under a “rational
basis test,”77 which is the lowest constitutional standard of
review and which gives the most deference to the
government. Under this framework, the Anaya court found
69. Anaya, 694 N.W.2d at 604.
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 604–05.
75. Id. at 606–08.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 608.
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that Nebraska’s screening program was rationally related to
the state’s legitimate interest in safeguarding public health
and, thus, did not violate the First Amendment.78
The court reached a similar conclusion with respect to
the Anayas’ Fourteenth Amendment claim, which the court
concluded was also subject to the rational basis test.79 In
analyzing the Anayas’ parental due process claim, the court
noted that mandatory screening could be likened to
mandatory immunization and that mandatory immunization
has been found to constitute a permissible use of state police
power.80 The Anaya court also noted that “[s]ociety’s interest
in protecting against the spread of disease takes precedence
over parental rights . . . .”81 The Anaya court quoted the U.S.
Supreme Court for the proposition that “the power of the
parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be
subject to limitation . . . if it appears that parental decisions
will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a
potential for significant social burdens.”82 The Anaya family
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but the Court declined
to hear the matter.83
As the Anaya case illustrates, the
collection of blood samples from newborn
purpose of genetic screening, will
constitutional attacks if it is neutral

state-mandated
infants, for the
likely survive
and generally

78. Id.
79. Id. at 607–08.
80. See id. at 607 (citing Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 954 (E.D.
Ark. 2002)).
81. Id. at 607 (citing Boone, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 954).
82. Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233–34 (1972)).
83. See Order Denying Certiorari, Anaya v. Douglas Cty., 546 U.S. 826 (2005)
(No. 04-1718). It is worthwhile to note that the federal court in the District of
Nebraska reached conclusions similar to those found in Anaya, namely that strict
scrutiny does not apply to state-mandated newborn screening and the right of
parents to rear their children does not trump the state’s power to advance public
health and safety. See Spiering v. Heineman, 448 F. Supp. 2d, 1129, 1138–42 (D.
Neb. 2006).
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applicable, and if it is done for the general welfare of the
citizens of a state.84 Understanding the contours of the
constitutionality of newborn screening is important because
the activity that has garnered the most controversy is not the
mere collection and testing of such samples, but rather what
states do with those samples beyond basic screening.85
Unlike the basic screening at issue in Anaya, the retention
of and experimentation with such samples has no connection
to the well-being of the specific child and therefore is
markedly unlike immunization.86 On the other hand, there
might still be a rational relationship between these
additional activities and the health and welfare of the
citizens of the state at large.87 Ultimately the question of
constitutionality, with respect to the retention and use of
such samples, remains open.
B. The Interplay of Genetic Privacy and Newborn
Screening Statutes
Another case, Bearder v. State, provides a snapshot of
the interplay between genetic privacy and newborn
screening statutes.88 In Bearder, the families of twenty-five
children, who had been tested under Minnesota’s newborn
screening program, filed suit against the State of Minnesota,
the Minnesota Department of Health, and the Minnesota
Commissioner of Health.89 The Bearder plaintiffs complained
that the defendants had violated the Minnesota “Genetic
Privacy Act” by allowing the state’s newborn screening
program to utilize residual dried blood samples in nonscreening activities and by disseminating blood samples to a
84. See, e.g., Anaya, 694 N.W.2d at 603–08.
85. See infra, Part II.B–C.
86. See Anaya, 694 N.W.2d at 604.
87. See generally id.
88. See Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d 766 (Minn. 2011).
89. Id. at 769.
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third-party research facility.90 The plaintiffs, in an amended
complaint, subsequently raised various tort and
constitutional causes of action in addition to the alleged
statutory violation.91
As the Minnesota Supreme Court noted, the state’s
genetic screening program typically expended seventy
percent of each newborn’s dried blood sample.92 The residue
of each sample, if any, was stored indefinitely by the state
unless an appropriate party specifically requested the
destruction of the specimen.93 As of at least the date of
publication of the Bearder opinion, more than 50,000 blood
samples had been used in studies for purposes unrelated to
initial newborn screening.94 In researching some of these
unrelated studies, Vani Kilakkathi found “one Minnesota
study that had used residual bloodspot samples to study
mercury exposure levels in the Lake Superior Basin . . . .”95
Kilakkathi also found “several articles from the 1990s that
used residual samples to examine the prevalence of HIV in
newborns to formulate recommendations about screening
pregnant women for HIV.”96
Additionally, Mayo Medical Laboratories (Mayo), the
third-party service provider for Minnesota newborn
screening program, conducted at least some of the studies
using newborn blood spots from Minnesota.97 Mayo’s studies
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 770.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 771.
95. VANI KILAKKATHI, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, NEWBORN
SCREENING IN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 11 (2012), http://www.councilfor
responsiblegenetics.org/pageDocuments/WNMAKEPP1P.pdf.
Kilakkathi’s
report offers an excellent survey of state policies regarding state retention of
newborn blood spots and the consent procedures adopted in each state. See id. at
29–37.
96. Id. at 11.
97. See Bearder, 806 N.W.2d at 771.
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were conducted pursuant to its contractual arrangement
with Minnesota, which permitted Mayo to use the residue of
the blood samples so long as they were “de-identified” or
written consent was given.98 The practices of the State of
Minnesota have vastly changed, as Minnesota now uses optin procedures for samples collected after August 1, 2014.99
Ultimately in Bearder, the trial court dismissed all of the
plaintiffs’ claims on summary judgment, finding that the tort
and constitutional claims failed to state a cause of action and
the statutory claims failed as a matter of law.100 The trial
court found that no statutory violation had occurred because
the samples did not constitute “genetic information” within
the meaning of Minnesota’s Genetic Privacy Act.101 The trial
court noted that the statutory claims also failed because
Minnesota’s Genetic Privacy Act did not supersede the
State’s newborn screening laws.102 The Minnesota Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the Minnesota
Genetic Privacy Act did not curtail the broad power of the
Minnesota Department of Health, but noting that the blood
samples were “genetic information” within the meaning of
the Act.103
Since 2006, Minnesota’s Genetic Privacy Act has
provided that genetic information may only be collected,
used, stored, and disseminated pursuant to written informed
consent.104 The statute, however, does not apply to uses

98. See id.
99. See Newborn Screening Information for Families: Parental Options, MINN.
DEP’T OF HEALTH, http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/phl/newborn/families/
parentaloptions.html#Example1 (last visited Apr. 26, 2016) [hereinafter
Newborn Screening Information for Families].
100. See Bearder, 806 N.W.2d at 769.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Bearder v. State, 788 N.W.2d 144, 149–50 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010).
104. See MINN. STAT. § 13.386 (2015).
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“otherwise expressly provided by law . . . .”105 The Minnesota
Supreme Court reviewed and reversed the lower courts,
finding that the blood samples were inextricably linked to
the genetic information contained with each sample, that the
Genetic Privacy Act applied to the actions of the Department
of Health, and that the State’s use of the blood samples was
limited to those uses authorized by statute; namely testing,
recording and reporting results, maintaining a registry for
follow-up care, and otherwise complying with federal laws.106
With respect to any samples collected prior to August 1,
2014, the Minnesota Department of Health indicates that
they will be or have been destroyed pursuant to a retention
policy that it appears to have adopted in 2014.107
The precise lesson to be gleaned from Bearder is that
even if a state has the power to share residual samples with
third-parties, without first obtaining informed consent, the
state’s legislature could curtail such conduct by enacting
legislation under its police powers on the theory that
individuals have a privacy interest in their genetic code.
More broadly, however, the situation in Minnesota exposes
two of the major concerns raised by mandatory screening,
which are whether the general public can trust states to
handle residual blood samples in a discreet manner and
whether the de-identification of residual samples is adequate
105. Id.
106. See Bearder, 806 N.W.2d at 774, 776–77.
107. See Newborn Screening Information for Families, supra note 99.
Minnesota Statute § 144.125 now sets forth guidelines on the how the State’s
newborn blood screening program may be stored and how residual dried blood
spots may be used. MINN. STAT. § 144.125 (2015). It also sets forth some
guidelines on when the State must obtain informed consent to conduct unrelated
research studies, and uses the “opt-in” method of consent. See id. The Statute
provides that “[w]ith the written, informed consent of a parent or legal guardian,
the Department of Health may use blood samples and test results for public
health studies or research not related to newborn screening, and upon approval
by the Department . . . share samples and test results with external parties for
public health studies or research.” Id. It appears that while the battle for
informed consent may have fallen short in the judiciary of Minnesota, it was won
in the legislature.
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to protect the privacy interests of the donor infants. Public
confidence in government acts is important and must be
taken into account when crafting any widespread policy that
deals with a controversy of this magnitude.108
C. The Illegality of Sharing Residual Dried Blood Samples
with Third-Parties
As the State of Texas has shown, it is tempting to make
use of resources that are otherwise seen as a waste. Texas
was handling residual dried blood samples in a manner
similar to the State of Minnesota, albeit in a manner that
was arguably more egregious than mere third-party
sharing.109 Since at least 1991, the Texas Department of
State Health Services (TDSHS) has mandated the collection
of blood spots from newborns.110 Unlike Minnesota, however,
Texas has utilized an “opt-out” system for newborn
screening—the state presumed consent to newborn
screening unless the parents of a particular child declined to
allow the procedure.111
With respect to the residue of the newborn blood spots,
Texas has “often provided blood samples to other
states . . . [as well as] distributed newborn bloodspots for
research projects ranging from various University-sponsored
disease studies, to the creation of a Department of Defensesponsored international database . . . and to for-profit
companies’ development of more effective screening test-

108. The issue of public confidence in state action is further discussed below.
See infra Part III.B.
109. See generally Higgins v. Tex. Dep’t of Health Servs., 801 F. Supp. 2d 541
(W.D. Tex. 2011); First Amended Complaint, Beleno v. Tex. Dep’t of State Health
Servs., No. SA-09-CA-0188-FB, 2009 WL 5072239 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2009).
110. See Higgins, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 550; First Amended Complaint, Beleno,
2009 WL 5072239.
111. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 33.012 (West 2010).
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kits.”112 Reports also indicate that Texas allegedly exchanged
blood
samples
for
monetary
and
non-monetary
remuneration, such as for the payment of fees or the
provision of laboratory supplies.113 Thus, Texas’ actions take
this issue to a new level, raising concerns about the propriety
of sharing residual blood samples for financial gain.
The activities of the TDSHS resulted in two media-hyped
lawsuits which garnered national attention. The earlier of
these cases, Beleno v. Texas Department of Health Services,
was a class action matter alleging that the use of the samples
in unrelated research and third-party sample sharing
violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.114 The
Beleno plaintiffs filed suit against several parties, the most
pertinent of which was the TDSHS and its Commissioner.115
In litigating the matter, the defendants argued that the
plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action because there
could be no unlawful seizure where the samples were
lawfully taken pursuant to Texas newborn screening

112. See Sandra J. Carnahan, Biobanking Newborn Bloodspots for Genetic
Research Without Consent, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 299, 305–06 (2011)
(citing Mary Ann Roser, State Agency Swaps Babies’ Blood for Supplies, AUSTIN
AM.-STATESMAN (May 10, 2010), http://www.statesman.com/news/texaspolitics/state-agency-swaps-babies-blood-for-supplies-0678302.html;
Newborn
Screening: Use of NBS Blood Spots After Completion of Newborn Screening, TEX.
DEP’T ST. HEALTH SERVS., http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/lab/nbsBloodspots
Use.shtm (last updated Jan. 23, 2015).
113. See Becca Aaronson, Lawsuit Alleges DSHS Sold Baby DNA Samples, TEX.
TRIB. (Dec. 8, 2010), https://www.texastribune.org/2010/12/08/lawsuit-allegesdshs-sold-baby-dna-samples; Jason Douglass, Texas Sells Babies’ Blood, Second
Lawsuit Filed, INFOWARS (Dec. 10, 2010), http://www.infowars.com/texas-sellsbabies-blood-second-lawsuit-filed.
114. First Amended Complaint, Beleno, 2009 WL 5072239.
115. See Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment Based on
Mootness, Beleno v. Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs., No. SA-09-CA-0188-FB,
2009 WL 5072237, at 1 n.1 (W.D. Tex. July 2, 2009). The other defendants in the
Beleno matter included Nancy W. Dickey (Vice Chancellor for Health Affairs of
the Texas A&M University System and President of the Texas A&M University
System Health Science Center), Roderick E. McCallum (Interim Dean of the
School of Rural Public Health), and Texas A&M University. Id.
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statutes.116 The Beleno defendants also argued that there
could be no violation of plaintiffs’ liberty interest in privacy
where the state had already complied with applicable state
and federal regulations regarding the maintenance of
medical information.117 In the alternative, the Beleno
defendants argued that the screening laboratory was HIPAA
compliant, HIPAA already codified the privacy interest
implicated by the claims, and any de-identified specimens
were not subject to the same privacy protections as identified
specimens.118
Midway through the course of the Beleno litigation,
Texas passed an amendment to its screening laws requiring
the TDSHS to create and utilize a disclosure form explaining
to the parents of newborns that residual samples may be
retained by the department or laboratory, the manner in
which the samples are managed and used, and that the
parents may limit the use of children’s genetic materials to
screening with a written request.119 The Beleno matter was
ultimately resolved on a settlement, which among other
things, involved requiring the TDSHS to publish and disclose
the research for which residual samples had been used. 120
Notably, the settlement agreement required the State of
Texas to destroy an estimated five million residual blood
samples!121 It was reported, however, that pursuant to the
settlement agreement, “the 10–12 000 [sic] blood spots
116. See Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint, Beleno
v. Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs., No. SA-09-CA-0188-FB, 2009 WL 5072234
(W.D. Tex. May 29, 2009).
117. See id.
118. See id. “HIPAA” is acronym that stands for the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. Id.
119. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 33.0111 (West 2010).
120. Higgins v. Tex. Dep’t of Health Servs., 801 F. Supp. 2d 541, 545–46 (W.D.
Tex. 2011).
121. See Monica J. Allen et al., Human Tissue Ownership and Use in Research:
What Laboratorians and Researchers Should Know, 56 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY
1675, 1680 (2010).
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already released to some 35 research projects could continue
to be used.”122
The second lawsuit brought in Texas, Higgins v. Texas
Department of Health Services, involved the parents of two
children seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in federal
court.123 As the Higgins court summarized, the plaintiffs
sought an order commanding state officials to “account for
and destroy all blood samples and spots . . . which
Defendants have distributed, sold, bartered, or traded
without informed parental consent . . . to advise Plaintiffs for
what purposes Defendants used the blood samples and spots
of Plaintiffs’ children and [to] disclose all financial
transactions involved . . . .”124 The West Texas District Court
dismissed the complaint for lack of standing and mootness.125
Among other things, the West Texas District Court noted
that the Higgins plaintiffs had not articulated a harm
different from the harm resolved in Beleno.126 The Higgins
court also noted that there was no ongoing harm, as Texas
had already passed an amendment addressing the issue of
non-consensual use of residual samples.127 Due to the
settlement of the Beleno controversy, the legality of the State
of Texas’ conduct remains untested. Whether fundamental
liberty, as embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment, requires
informed consent for the use of residual dried blood samples
in research aimed at improving the screening process,
remains unanswered. Outstanding still are the issues of
what would even constitute confidential, genetic
information, and, assuming such information is lawfully
obtained, whether such information may be bartered to
third-parties for use in wholly unrelated research. Beleno
demonstrates the potential for the abuse of a newborn
122. Id.
123. Higgins, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 546.
124. Id. at 551.
125. See id. at 551–55.
126. See id. at 552.
127. See id.
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screening program by state actors and brings to light issues
of widespread concern.
III. THE ISSUE OF INFORMED CONSENT & POTENTIAL
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
While it is tempting, in discussing the establishment of
uniform national standards, to look for a federal solution, one
is not always forthcoming. Even if it is forthcoming, the
solution is not always satisfying. This Part is separated into
three subparts.128 The first subpart explores potential
mechanisms for implementing uniform standards.129 The
second subpart considers how to balance the value of genetic
testing with social interests in the context of informed
consent.130 The third subpart explores previous suggestions
for dealing with the issue of informed consent, while setting
forth the author’s recommended approach.131
A. Mechanisms for Implementing a Uniform Standard
There have been calls to action for unifying state policies
regarding mandatory screening and the handling of residual
dried blood samples—but very little uniformity has emerged.
One reason for this lack of uniformity is the struggle to find
an appropriate widespread enforcement mechanism for
compelling states and/or laboratories to adopt more complex
informed consent policies. As the Bearder case demonstrates,
simply granting every U.S. citizen a statutory right to
privacy for their genetic information (or perhaps even a
property interest) would cleanly solve the problem by

128. See infra Part III.
129. See infra Part III.A.
130. See infra Part III.B.
131. See infra Part III.C.
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prohibiting sample sharing with third-parties absent
consent.132
Such a solution is sweeping, but not unimaginable. After
all, the federal government did pass the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), which established
limitations on the disclosure of genetic information in the
insurance and employment contexts.133 Yet, GINA was an
exercise of the federal government’s power under the
Commerce Clause, limited to employment and insurance
providers—two areas that have a close nexus to interstate
commerce.134 The same rationale would be a tough sell in the
context of the purely intrastate handling of residual dried
blood samples. Furthermore, the power of state sovereigns to
regulate public health and safety runs deep in our country’s
traditions.135
At least two authors have considered the Common Rule
and argued for its application to the retention and use of
residual newborn blood samples.136 The Common Rule refers
to the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects,
which was published in 1991.137 The Common Rule was

132. See supra Part II.B.
133. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–
233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008). See generally Questions and Answers for Small
Businesses: EEOC Final Rule on Title II of the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/gina_qanda_smallbus.cfm (last visited
Nov. 2, 2013).
134. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 122 Stat. 881.
135. See Jorge E. Galva et al., Public Health Strategy and the Police Powers of
the State, 120 PUB. HEALTH REP. 20, 20 (2005) (“The doctrine of state ‘police power’
was adopted in early colonial America from firmly established English common
law principles mandating the limitation of private rights when needed for the
preservation of the common good.”).
136. See Carnahan, supra note 112, at 315–25; Katherine Drabiak-Syed, Legal
Regulation of Banking Newborn Blood Spots for Research: How Bearder and
Beleno Resolved the Question of Consent, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1 (2011).
137. FEDERAL POLICY FOR HUMAN SUBJECTS (‘COMMON RULE’), U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp (last visited Oct. 20, 2013)
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codified in the regulations of fifteen different federal
agencies138 and, in three other agencies, adopted by executive
order or statute.139 The Common Rule, for each applicable
agency, sets forth guidelines for the maintenance of
institutional review boards, standards of obtaining informed
consent from human subjects, and assurances of
compliance.140
However, the Common Rule does not apply to the states
in any direct, binding manner and is limited to research that
is funded or undertaken by the applicable federal agencies.141
Additionally, de-identified samples would not be subject to
human research protection under the guidelines of the
Common Rule.142 Ultimately, grounding a solution to the
(select “Regulation and Policy,” then select “Regulations,” then select “Common
Rule”).
138. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 1c.101–1c.124. (Department of Agriculture); 10 C.F.R. §§
745.101–745.124 (Department of Energy); 14 C.F.R. §§ 1230.101–1230.103
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration); 15 C.F.R. §§ 27.101–27.124
(Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology); 16
C.F.R. §§ 1028.101–1028.124 (Consumer Product Safety Commission); 22 C.F.R.
§§ 225.101–225.124 (Agency for International Development); 24 C.F.R. § 60.101
(Department of Housing and Urban Development); 28 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–46.124
(Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice); 32 C.F.R. §§ 219.101–
219.124 (Department of Defense); 34 C.F.R. §§ 97.101–97.124 (Department of
Education); 38 C.F.R. §§ 16.101–16.124 (Department of Veteran Affairs, Office of
Research Oversight and Office of Research and Development); 40 C.F.R. §§
26.101-26.124 (Environmental Protection Agency, Research and Development);
45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–46.409 (Department of Health and Human Services); 45
C.F.R. §§ 690.101–690.124 (National Science Foundation); 49 C.F.R. §§ 11.101–
11.124 (Department of Transportation).
139. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–46.409 (applicable to Central Intelligence Agency
by Exec. Order No. 12333); 6 U.S.C. § 112 (2016) (applying the Common Rule to
the research activities of Department of Homeland Security); 42 U.S.C. § 901
(2016) (the Social Security Administration remains subject to the regulations
imposed upon the Department of Health and Human Services after separating in
1994).
140. See FEDERAL POLICY FOR HUMAN SUBJECTS, supra note 137.
141. See id. (“Human subject research conducted or supported by each federal
department/agency is governed by the regulations of that department/agency.”).
142. Mark A. Rothstein, Is Deidentification Sufficient to Protect Health Privacy
in Research?, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3, 3–4 (2010).
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problem of informed consent in the Common Rule suffers
from the same problems inherent in other federal regulations
in place—it does not directly answer the concerns raised by
the public (i.e., the propriety of sharing de-identified
samples) and has no real direct mechanism of enforcement
(i.e., it is at best an incentive program). Any solution that
fails to address these problems would be inadequate to
maintain and support public confidence in newborn
screening programs and the handling of residual blood
samples by state officials.
Of course, the federal government could adopt more
specific guidelines for when and how informed consent for
the retention and use of residual samples is obtained and
then simply rely on incentivizing state adoption of the federal
government’s position on the matter. There are already apt
examples of this approach. For example, the Newborn
Screening Saves Lives Act of 2007 permits the federal
funding of outreach and education programs and establishes
nationwide recommendations for newborn screening.143 The
Act does not discuss or establish protocols for obtaining
informed consent for the storage of, or research conducted on,
newborn blood samples.144 Rather, the Act generally supports
research aimed at improving newborn screening in federally
funded activities.145 Expanding the Act to include more
complex and thoughtful standards for obtaining informed
consent would be an excellent starting point, but again would
not guarantee state compliance.
In past years, the federal government has appeared
hesitant to take on the task of articulating clear and
comprehensive national standards on the issues of retaining

143. See Newborn Screening Saves Lives Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-204, 112
Stat. 705 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300b-8 to 300b-15 (2008)).
144. See generally id.
145. See § 7, 122 Stat. at 711-72 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300b-15).

2016]

INFORMED CONSENT

1045

and experimenting with residual dried blood samples.146
However, in 2010, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services’ Advisory Committee on Heritable Disorders in
Newborns and Children published recommendations to help
guide state policies on the storage and use of residual dried
blood samples.147 The Report presented eight specific
recommendations, one of which was that “[a]ll state newborn
screening programs should create policies that are in
compliance with federal research regulations, assure that
parents are aware of these activities, and consider whether
documentation of parents’ wishes and willingness to
participate are required.”148 The report appears not to
prescribe specific conditions for consent in the context at
hand, and merely recommends that a policy be adopted that
conforms to the tenants of the Common Rule.149 It is perhaps
the case that no specific, clear federal guidance is
forthcoming in this area and, perhaps, no such guidance is
appropriate or even necessary. Requiring informed consent
may be more a matter of local public policy than of the law,
in which case the question is one for the state political arena
and not the national stage.
More recently, President Obama signed into law the
Newborn Screening Saves Lives Reauthorization Act of
2014.150 The Act reauthorizes federal grant programs that
146. See Bob Bryan, A Closer Look at Biobanking of Newborn Blood Spots,
GENOMICS L. REP. (July 1, 2009), http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/
2009/07/01/a-closer-look-at-biobanking-of-newborn-blood-spots.
147. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON HERITABLE DISORDERS IN NEWBORNS AND
CHILDREN, BRIEFING PAPER: CONSIDERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
NATIONAL GUIDANCE REGARDING THE RETENTION AND USE OF RESIDUAL DRIED
BLOOD SPOT SPECIMENS AFTER NEWBORN SCREENING 1, 24 (Sept. 2010), http://
www.hrsa.gov/advisorycommittees/mchbadvisory/heritabledisorders/
recommendations/correspondence/briefingdriedblood.pdf.
148. Id. at 4–5.
149. See id.
150. See generally Newborn Screening Saves Lives Reauthorization Act of 2014,
Pub. L. No. 113-240, 128 Stat. 2851 (2014).
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encourage newborn genetic screening, and supports related
initiatives, but stipulates that the associated research is
deemed human subjects research and prescribes some
restrictions on the method by which informed consent can be
obtained, including a prohibition on informed consent
waivers.151 These glacially slow movements of the federal
government are steps in the right direction, but they do not
fully balance the interests of states and the families of
newborn infants, and (while serving as excellent guidance)
do not guarantee that a state will utilize an effective
informed consent model for their program for the reasons
already stated above.
B. Balancing the Need for Informed Consent
Testing for genetic illness is not always beneficial to the
individual being tested. As Pellegrino points out, an excellent
example of the tension between informed consent and the
social value of genetic screening can be seen in the proposed
testing of Huntington’s disease.152 “Huntington’s is a lateonset neurological disorder, always fatal, and at present
untreatable.”153 The offspring of an individual with
Huntington’s disease have a fifty percent chance of having
the gene and the associated illness.154 “Nancy Wexler has
written with passion and eloquence on the tremendous
complexity of the question of whether or not someone at risk
for Huntington’s should choose to be tested . . . [concluding]
that there is no right decision for everyone, and that each

151. See id.
152. EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO, PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE
CHANGING MORAL FOCUS OF NEWBORN SCREENING: AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS 75
(2008).
153. Id.
154. Id.
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person at risk must be allowed to make that decision for him
or herself after reaching young adulthood.”155
Pellegrino points out, “As there is currently no treatment
and no medical benefit from early detection, and a positive
diagnosis is so potentially devastating, there has been
widespread agreement that Huntington’s is one of the
genetic disorders least suitable for routine screening,
especially at birth or in early childhood.”156 In many ways,
forcing a person to learn of their inevitable decline in health
impinges upon that individual’s autonomy.157
Moreover, the psychological toll that such knowledge
may have on an individual diagnosed with a terminal, lateonset illness likely outweighs any benefit that knowledge
would have for that person.158 Individuals should have the
option to remain free of the fears and apprehensions that
accompany the heavy burden of knowing one’s fate.159 In
balancing the needs of individuals and society at large, the
violation of an individual’s right to autonomy is frequently
offset by the value of such knowledge guiding the treatment
of that individual—particularly when it comes to infants. If
that offset is missing, the activity is one which should be
handled carefully and likely only with informed consent.
These same issues are not directly implicated by the
storage and use of residual dried blood samples in nondiagnostic screening. However, understanding these
concerns informs us that not all genetic screening is
beneficial to the individual being screened and, sometimes,
the mere knowledge of having a given gene can be
155. Id. (citing Nancy S. Wexler, The Tiresias Complex: Huntington’s Disease
as a Paradigm of Testing for Late-Onset Disorders, 6 FASEB J. 2820, 2824
(1992)).
156. Id. at 75–76.
157. See id. at 76.
158. See id. at 77.
159. See generally id.
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detrimental to the wellness of that individual.160 Any model
of informed consent to widespread testing of a wide array of
genetic illnesses must carefully account for the interests of
the individual person being tested. It cannot be properly
grounded in the interests of society at large or even that
individual’s local community, without a close nexus to the
interests of the individual being tested. Accordingly, the
ideal informed consent model will scale according to how
close the connection is between the interests of the infant
being screened and the proposed state action at issue.
On one end of the spectrum is genetic testing for a
treatable illness the infant might have, while on the other
end of the spectrum is genetic experimentation, which has no
real connection to either the donor or the newborn screening
program. As the proposed activity reaches the latter end of
the spectrum, the need for informed consent is heightened,
as the likelihood of constitutionality of the state action begins
to wan.161 The remainder of this Article is dedicated to
describing the basic structure of an informed consent model
that would address the various concerns discussed
throughout this writing.

160. It is worthwhile to note that having a gene associated with the
development of an illness does not always necessarily entail the development of
that illness. For example, mutations in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, the
expression of which helps regulate the repair of damaged DNA, do not necessarily
lead to the development of breast cancer, while such mutations may greatly
predispose an individual to illness. See generally Ass’n for Molecular Pathology
v. Myriad Genetics Inc., 569 U.S. _____, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (deciding on the
patentability of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes). As Pellegrino points out, “[o]nly
a small proportion of the abnormal gene variants uncovered by newborn profiling
will lead directly and inexorably to serious illness . . . .” PELLEGRINO, supra note
152, at 76. “Typically, medically important SNPs [single nucleotide
polymorphisms] will merely correlate (often in combination with other SNPs)
with elevated susceptibilities for various medical conditions, and even these
correlations will be unpredictable and highly variable, depending on a host of
unknown factors.” Id.
161. See generally Douglas Cty. v. Anaya, 694 N.W.2d 601, 601–08 (Neb. 2005).
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C. Finding the Correct Model of Informed Consent
In treading the murky waters of informed consent, it is
important to bear in mind the lessons taught by the Anaya
case.162 Namely, Anaya demonstrates that states likely have
the constitutional authority to collect newborn blood spots
and then to use those blood spots in manner rationally
related to public health and safety.163 In considering issues of
informed consent, it is therefore important to remind
ourselves that states do not necessarily need informed
consent for every conceivable use of residual newborn blood
samples.
The “[e]lements of a traditional model of informed
consent include an explanation of the proposed research, its
purpose, a description of potential risks and benefits to the
individuals participating, and a statement that participation
is voluntary and can be discontinued at any time.”164 Where
participation can be lawfully made involuntary, it follows
that informed consent would be unnecessary. However,
gratuitously providing meaningful information to laypersons may nevertheless be a prudent policy for states when
it comes to this area of public health and general welfare.
Thus, it is important to distinguish between minimal
standards and best practices when it comes to describing the
ideal informed consent model.
In her 2011 article, Sandra J. Carnahan argues that all
states should be required to obtain informed consent prior to
the use of residual dried blood samples from state-mandated,
genetic newborn screening, and presumed consent is an

162. See supra Part II.B.
163. See Anaya, 694 N.W.2d at 608; supra Part II.B.; see also Sister Renée
Mirkes, Newborn Screening: Toward a Just System, 22 ETHICS & MED. 163, 170
(2006).
164. Helen Swede et al., National Population-Based Biobanks for Genetic
Research, 9 GENETICS MED. 141, 145 (2007).
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inadequate solution.165 Carnahan’s approach, however,
would create undue roadblocks to important genetic research
for the sake of improving public confidence in the exercise of
state power.166 Beyond the incidents leading to the lawsuits
in Texas, there is little data to suggest that any other states
have used residual dried blood samples in the context of
commercial gain.167
To the contrary, the most commonly reported uses for
residual dried blood samples are actually much less ominous:
some states utilize residual samples for confirmatory
diagnosis (in an effort to avoid false positives) or for research
aimed at improving the state’s overall screening program.168
Residual samples, for instance, are essential in
understanding “[t]he full spectrum of a specific genetic
disease” by allowing developers to determine “the range of
severity of the disease, its incidence and genetic etiology in
the general population and in subpopulations . . . .”169 Thus,
while the controversy regarding newborn bloodspots, which
arose in Texas, made national headlines, the perceived
problem of profiteering at the expense of the privacy of
citizens may be more of a tempest in a teapot.
Furthermore, the autonomy concerns implicated by the
traditional underpinnings of informed consent are
diminished with respect to infants, who do not make selfactualizing decisions with respect to their own medical

165. See Carnahan, supra note 112, at 325–29.
166. See generally id.
167. Whether this lack of data is the result of underreporting or lack of
occurrence is unclear.
168. See Kharaboyan et al., supra note 47, at 742 (listing the following uses for
residual newborn blood spots: confirmatory diagnosis, quality assurance and
public health needs, research use, clinical testing, and non-medical use).
169. AM. COLL. OF MED. GENETICS, POSITION STATEMENT ON IMPORTANCE OF
RESIDUAL NEWBORN SCREENING DRIED BLOOD SPOTS (2009), https://www.acmg.net
(select “Publications,” select “Policy Statements”).
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care.170 A parent’s decision to volunteer the DNA samples of
their children for research impinges upon an infant’s
autonomy no less and no more than a state’s decision to do
the same. To hold the contrary would be to conflate true
autonomy concerns with the right of biological parents to
make medical decisions for their children. As the Anaya
court notes, the right of parents to make decisions for their
children is not unfettered.171 More importantly, such a right
implicates a relatively low level of constitutional scrutiny.172
Nevertheless, there is merit in the claim that mandatory
genetic research on all newborn samples could undermine
public confidence in state-mandated genetic screening
systems—especially given the bad publicity such programs
have received in Minnesota and Texas.173 This is particularly
true of those programs that seek to utilize the dried blood
samples in research unrelated to newborn screening or to
otherwise share blood samples with third-party research
entities.174 Different uses implicate different issues. It follows
that different uses warrant a tiered approach that blends the
presumed and informed consent approaches, while
170. See generally Christopher M. O’Connor & Kevin N. Lorah, Dilemmas at the
Beginning of Life: Biomedical Ethics in the Newborn, 3 J. LANCASTER GEN. HOSP.,
Fall 2008, at 102 (“Across the country, it is well settled that the parents are the
decision-makers for the newborn. Yet, in extreme cases, states have the ability to
usurp parental authority. Less settled, however, is the degree to which parents’
moral and religious beliefs should influence treatment decisions.”).
171. Douglas Cty. v. Anaya, 694 N.W.2d 601, 608 (Neb. 2005).
172. See id.
173. See generally Beth A. Tarini, Storage and Use of Residual Newborn
Screening Blood Spots: A Public Policy Emergency, 13 GENETICS MED. 619, 620
(2011) (commenting that while the matter is often discussed in terms of law and
ethics, there is a greater concern regarding public policy and perception of
governmental action) [hereinafter Tarini, Storage and Use].
174. See, e.g., Rob Stein, Newborns’ Blood Samples Are Used for Research
Without Parents’ Consent, WASH. POST (June 30, 2009), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/06/29/AR2009062903118.html;
J. Scott Applewhite, Debate Over Blood Samples from Babies, USA TODAY (Feb.
9,
2010),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/2010-02-08-babyblood_N.htm.
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recognizing the sovereign authority of the states to make
important decisions to advance the health and safety of their
citizens.
States should openly utilize residual newborn blood
samples in confirmatory screening and for research aimed at
maintaining the very screening program that administers
the testing. They should also require informed consent for
such practices only to the extent that state policy deems
appropriate for ensuring public confidence.175
While we found that the vast majority of parents were willing to
permit the state to store their children’s [newborn blood spot]
samples, 22% of parents were not willing to permit storage of their
children’s [newborn blood spot] samples. Non-participation of this
magnitude could create problems in using the [newborn blood spot]
blood samples either for ongoing program evaluation (e.g.,
[newborn blood spot] candidate test validity studies) or for future
research studies that rely on the population representation of this
sample collection.176

Research related to maintaining the overall integrity and
quality of a newborn genetic screening program would likely
be found rationally related to a state’s goal of advancing
public health and safety, and consequently fall within a
state’s regulatory powers.177 To that end, informed consent
should not be strictly required for confirmatory diagnoses or
for use in research aimed at improving or calibrating the
originating state’s screening program. In any event, public
confidence in newborn screening programs would remain
relatively unphased by state-run research that ultimately
175. See generally Bradford L. Therrell, Jr. et al., Committee Report:
Considerations and Recommendations for National Guidance Regarding the
Retention and Use of Residual Dried Blood Spot Specimens After Newborn
Screening, 13 GENETICS MED. 621, 622 (2011) (“State policies also should
emphasize transparency of administrative practices and create supporting
information that encourages informed public participation.”).
176. Beth A. Tarini et al., Not Without My Permission: Parents’ Willingness to
Permit Use of Newborn Screening Samples for Research, 13 PUB. HEALTH
GENOMICS 125, 129 (2010).
177. See, e.g., Spiering v. Heineman, 448 F. Supp. 2d, 1129, 1140 (D. Neb. 2006);
Anaya, 694 N.W.2d at 608.
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ensures the continued improvement and operation of such
programs.
However, at a minimum, states should presume parental
consent, but allow for opt-outs, with respect to the sharing of
de-identified residual newborn blood samples with thirdparties or the use of such samples in unrelated research.178
The doctrine of presumed consent operates on a notion that
if the individual infant could volunteer their sample, they
would, or perhaps more aptly, that parents would allow the
de-identified samples to be used in unrelated scientific
research.179 This approach strikes a compromise. The
samples, at this point, would have already been lawfully
acquired by the state.180 They would be de-identified and,
hence, no longer subject to the Common Rule.181 The samples
would, in effect, be bio-waste with no identifiable individual
stake-holders other than the state.182
States should always obtain informed consent prior to
use, or disclosure to third-parties, of any identifiable
newborn blood samples and should refrain from bartering or

178. Opt-out approaches should be utilized with caution, however, as they
threaten the reliability of research studies through selection bias. Kharaboyan et
al., supra note 47, at 747. Nevertheless, “[r]esearch suggests that denying parents
an opportunity to provide their permission—whether through opt-in or opt-out
mechanisms, written or verbal—is likely to damage public support causing
programs to lose both the battle and the war.” Tarini, Storage and Use, supra
note 173, at 620.
179. See Carnahan, supra note 112, at 326–27.
180. See supra Part II.A.
181. Rothstein, supra note 142, at 3.
182. See generally ALISSA JOHNSON ET AL., CURRENT STATE PRACTICES AND
POLICIES ON THE STORAGE AND USE OF NEWBORN SCREENING SAMPLES (2010),
https://www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/~/media/Files/Activity%20Files/Resear
ch/GenomicBasedResearch/Commissioned%20Reports/State%20Practice-Policy
%20Residual%20DBS%20IOM%20-%20approved.pdf (“Laws and regulations in
California, Maine, Utah and Washington declare that newborn screening
specimens are the property of the state.”).
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selling samples for commercial gain.183 Identification is at the
heart of privacy concerns and would likely lead to significant
public outcry.184 Similarly, the systematic appropriation of
genetic materials for gain has and would likely again lead to
significant public pushback.185 While one might argue that
with parental informed consent the practice would be legal,
it would nevertheless be unwise and, ultimately, likely to
instigate litigation. Furthermore, there is too great a risk
that openly allowing such practices will lead to the
exploitation of newborns, whose interests need to be
zealously safeguarded both by parents and society at large.186
Given the lack of benefit to the newborn, and the high
likelihood of public outcry, these practices should be avoided
where possible and always mitigated with cautiously
obtained informed consent.
Of course, employing a tiered method, which makes
compromises, will likely still incite public criticism, but any
state action will have its detractors. There was, in fact, some
criticism of Indiana’s mere storage of such samples.187 Since
at least 1991, the Indiana State Department of Health has
been collecting blood samples from newborn infants and
storing the residual samples for potential later use in
research.188 As of 2014, it was estimated that the cache
contained somewhere between 2.25 and 2.5 million samples,

183. See Carnahan, supra note 112, at 300–01; Drabiak-Syed, supra note 136,
at 1, 3; Tarini, Storage and Use, supra note 173, at 620.
184. See generally Carnahan, supra note 112; Drabiak-Syed, supra note 136;
Tarini, Storage and Use, supra note 173.
185. See, e.g., Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 2011); First
Amended Complaint, Beleno v. Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs., No. SA-09-CA0188-FB, 2009 WL 5072239 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2009).
186. See O’Connor & Lorah, supra note 170.
187. See Indiana Stored Babies’ DNA, Blood for Research Without Parental
Consent, RT (July 14, 2014, 2:29 AM), https://www.rt.com/usa/172208-indianababy-blood-samples.
188. Id.
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contained in 666 bankers boxes.189 No parental consent has
been obtained for such research and, accordingly, it appears
Indiana has not allowed the samples to be used in this
manner.190
Yet, the very notion that a state would consider such
research has generated negative commentary by the
public.191 “‘I’m curious why they didn’t share that,’ Mallory
Ervin, the mother of a 4-year-old named Theo, said. ‘It now
makes me think “what are they hiding?” As a parent, I’d
absolutely like to know.’”192 Public confidence is a fickle thing
and, while it is important to consider in striking the right
balance in shaping policy, it cannot be the only consideration.
For years, Indiana collected and stored these samples
without any concrete plan on when and how to use these
samples.193 As a result, Indiana never obtained informed
consent and, years later, acknowledge the struggle with
deciding how to proceed.194 “‘No, we did nothing to notify
parents,’ Bob Bowman, director of [Indiana State
Department of Health’s] Genomics & Newborn Screening
Program, said to the Indiana NBC affiliate. ‘That’s why we
are struggling right now to try to figure out what is the best
and most appropriate thing to do.’”195
Ultimately, as of June of 2013, the Indiana Genomics
and Newborn Screening Program adopted a notification
policy that now seeks parental consent for possible future

189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. Id.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. Id.
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research.196 If parents elect to opt out of future research
activities, the State of Indiana does not store the dried blood
samples and instead destroys them.197 With respect to
samples obtained prior to enactment of the 2013 policy
update, Indiana permits guardians to request the
destruction of previously stored dried blood samples by
having them send in a written form that can be obtained on
the State’s website.198
The newer processes adopted in Indiana are an
improvement on the State’s past practices, and while it does
not fully account for the potential trespass of having stored
dried blood spots for years without informed consent, it does
address many of the major concerns that arise with the
disposition of residual newborn blood samples. The difficult
questions faced by Indiana could have been avoided by
adopting the notification policy much sooner, and this should
serve as a cautionary tale to any states that have not yet
incorporated a clear informed consent policy.199
CONCLUSION
It is certainly possible that as technology develops, the
list of newborn blood spot related activities warranting
informed consent may continue to grow. However, the
controversies catching the most media attention in this area
have focused on those concerns discussed in Part III. The
diversity of these issues illustrates that the “best” approach
to dealing with the conundrum of informed consent in the
context of newborn screening will constrict state power no
further than necessary, while simultaneously curtailing
those activities that are most offensive to the public
196. See id.; Newborn Screening Home: Newborn Screening Dried Blood Spot,
IND. ST. DEP’T HEALTH, http://www.in.gov/isdh/20215.htm (last visited Apr. 25,
2016).
197. Newborn Screening Home, supra note 196.
198. Id.
199. See generally id.
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conscience.200 A vehicle for encouraging national uniformity
in the handling of residual samples has not emerged, but
when it does, the country needs to be ready for a complex
solution to a complex problem.201

200. See supra Part III.
201. See supra Part III.B.

